MILTON FRIEDMAN HAS A LOT TO ANSWER
FOR: A RESPONSE TO JOSHUA FERSHEE’S
“LONG LIVE DIRECTOR PRIMACY: SOCIAL
BENEFIT ENTITIES AND THE DOWNFALL OF
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY”
Becky L. Jacobs *
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee of the
owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to
make as much money as possible while conforming to their basic rules of the society,
both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.
Milton Friedman 1
In his seminal article, economist Milton Friedman restated his
position that “there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its
profits . . . .” 2 Evangelical Friedman preached to an appreciative choir,
and his shareholder wealth maximization 3 (“SWM”) theory, emphasis
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Id. (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962)).

For this essay, I will use the terms “shareholder primacy” and “shareholder wealth
maximization” interchangeably.
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intended, has survived Gordon Gekko’s “greed is good” era 4 to become
a foundational corporate doctrine. While, as my colleague Joan
Heminway so succinctly notes, “none of [the relevant] statutory frameworks regarding officer and director management or conduct mention—
no less require—management action in a manner that maximizes
shareholder wealth or value or compels shareholder primacy[,]” 5
shareholder primacy and the maximization of shareholder wealth are
axiomatic corporate governance objectives. Even if it has not been
codified, SWM is the mantra by which most corporate lawyers and
MBAs are indoctrinated and how they frame their advice to directors:
“maximize shareholder wealth.” This makes sense given that, until the
relatively recent introduction of benefit corporate structures, our system
was structured binarily as for profit or non-profit, with our securities and
tax laws regulating and perpetuating the distinctions.
It is a particularly rational belief in Delaware, where the judiciary
appears to have quite a thirst for Friedman’s economic “Kool-Aid.” 6
This quote was made famous in a speech made by Michael Douglas in his role as
Gordon Gekko. WALL STREET (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 1987).
4

Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes,
Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 948 (2017) (citing
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Non-Shareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV.
971, 990 (1992)).
5

A humorous representation of Friedman’s “Free-Market Kool Aid” appears in DAILY
KOS. Azazello, Milton Friedman: The Man Who Made the Kool-Aid, DAILY KOS (June 2,
2010, 6:32 PM), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2010/6/2/869765/-. Beginning
with Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), the Delaware courts have consistently
concluded that for-profit corporations must seek profit for their stockholders. See, e.g.,
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). In a published speech eerily reminiscent of
both the tone and the substance of Milton Friedman’s writings, Chancellor Leo Strine
of the Delaware Court of Chancery states unequivocally that “for-profit corporations
will seek profit for their stockholders using all legal means available[.]” Leo E. Strine,
Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Firms Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 135, 136 (2012). The fact that courts have rarely had to opine on director
obligations regarding shareholder wealth maximization is likely attributable to the
6
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Despite the fact that the Delaware Code does not require that corporations be formed for a specific purpose, 7 nor does it directly specify the
constituency on whose behalf the directors manage a corporation’s
affairs, 8 it is difficult to ignore the words of Delaware Chief Justice Strine
in his 2015 Wake Forest Law Review article in which he opines that it is
a pretense “that directors do not have to make stockholder welfare the
sole end of corporate governance within the limits of their legal discretion, under the law of the most important American jurisdiction –
Delaware.” 9

Delaware judiciary’s strong adherence to the business judgement rule. As one
commentator has so eloquently and concisely put it:
Because of the business judgment rule, directors
have near total discretion to run firms the way
they see fit. It is true, therefore, that it is nearly
impossible to enforce the shareholder primacy
norm through litigation, absent, essentially, an explicit statement by directors that they are managing the firm towards some other goal. Absent, that
is, a confession that negates the presumption of
good faith that the business judgment rule supplies.
David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 223 (2013).
7

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b).

Id. § 141(a). Commentators contend that Delaware code indirectly imposes fiduciary
duties on directors to the corporation and its stockholders by authorizing corporations
to excuse directors from liability for breaches of that obligation: “the certificate of
incorporation may also contain . . . [a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for
breach of fiduciary duty . . . .” Id. § 102(b)(7).
8

Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the
Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 763–64 (2015).
9
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In this symposium and elsewhere, 10 Joshua Fershee expresses his
concern that the rise of social benefit entities only reinforces this
normative trend, undermining director primacy and providing even
stronger grounds for judicial scrutiny of director decisions with public or
social benefit aspects. In his article for this symposium, Professor
Fershee states:
[T]here is an increased risk that traditional
entities will be viewed (by both courts and
directors) as pure profit vehicles, eliminating directors’ ability to make choices with
the public benefit in mind, even where the
public benefit is also good for business (at
least in the long term). Narrowing directors’ decision making in this way limits
the options for innovation, building
goodwill, and maintaining an engaged
workforce, to the detriment of employees,
society, and, yes, shareholders. 11
I both agree and disagree with Professor Fershee’s gloomy assessment of the state of play in this area of the law. I agree that he may
be at least theoretically correct in Delaware and that he will find support
among the judiciary in that state. 12 However, I disagree more generally
See, e.g., Joshua Fershee, Long Live Director Primacy: Social Benefit Entities and the Downfall
of Social Responsibility, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF BLOG (July 18,
2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2017/07/long-live-directorprimacy-social-benefit-entities-and-the-downfall-of-social-responsibility.html.
10

Joshua P. Fershee, The End of Responsible Growth and Governance?: The Risks Posed by
Social Enterprise Enabling Statutes and the Demise of Director Primacy, 19 TENN. J. BUS. L. 361
(2017).
11

One might infer this from public writings of the Chief Justice, Delaware Supreme
Court Leo E. Strine, Jr.:
12

That is what is refreshing about the benefit corporation movement. Rather than ignore the importance of the accountability structure within
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for several reasons, the first of which is that Delaware is just one State
among fifty, even if it is incredibly influential in the corporate law
context. 13 Further, while SWM may be a strong, persistent, judiciallycreated norm in Delaware, constantly reinforced by some of the very
judges who helped to establish and are determined to maintain its
dominance, 14 even its most ardent advocates acknowledge that, as
which corporate managers operate, the benefit
corporation movement set out to change it. In the
liberal tradition of incremental, achievable reform
rather than radical renovation, the benefit corporation is a modest evolution that builds on the
American tradition of corporate law. But that evolution is potentially important because, if it gains
broader market acceptance, the benefit corporation model puts some actual power behind the
idea that corporations should be governed not
simply for the best interests of stockholders, but
also for the best interests of the corporation's employees, consumers, and communities, and society
generally.
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 235, 242 (2014).
See infra. Discussions on the topic of corporate purpose are incredibly confusing for
the uninitiated; commentators are all over the map. There is a dizzying array of special
purpose legal mechanisms designed for profit distribution and CSR impact: (1) a lowprofit limited liability company; (2) a flexible purpose corporation; (3) a social purpose
corporation; (4) a benefit corporation; and (5) a benefit LLC. See, e.g., Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Report, Balancing Purpose and Profit: Legal Mechanisms to Lock in Social
Mission for “Profit with Purpose” Businesses across the G8, 8 (Dec. 2014), https://
www.trust.org/contentAsset/raw-data/1d3b4f99-2a65-49f9-9bc0-39585bc52cac/file.
13

When discussing corporate purpose or director responsibility or fiduciary duty, some
business law experts speak in terms of SWM; some in terms of Shareholder Primacy;
some in terms of Director Primacy; and yet others of the Business Judgment Rule. For
non-academics trying to find solid guidance on how to structure their business affairs,
it is a minefield of acronyms, disagreements, confusion, and contention.
14

See, e.g., Strine, supra note 6.
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previously mentioned, no statute imposes a legal obligation on directors
to maximize short-term shareholder wealth in the ordinary course of
everyday business decision-making. 15
Too, let us not forget the Business Judgment Rule (“BJR”),
which is alive and well in Delaware and elsewhere. As Delaware’s
Chancellor Chandler himself acknowledged in the eBay case, under the
BJR, absent conflicts of interest, there is a presumption that directors
acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company. 16 While he
ultimately decided in that case that the craigslist directors were not
entitled to the BJR presumption, the Chancellor stated that, “[w]hen
director decisions are reviewed under the business judgment rule, this
Court will not question rational judgments about how promoting nonstockholder interests—be it through making a charitable contribution,
paying employees higher salaries and benefits, or more general norms
like promoting a particular corporate culture—ultimately promote
stockholder value.” 17
It is also significant that a substantial number of states, some
thirty plus or so, have adopted “other constituency” statutes that
emphasize management’s ability to consider the effects of corporate
action on a variety of stakeholders when exercising business judgment. 18
Permissible constituency groups vary from state to state, but typically

15

Joan MacLeod Heminway, supra note 5, at 946.

16

See eBay, 16 A.3d at 36.

Id. at 33. The Chancellor concluded that the business judgment rule's protections did
not apply to the ROFR/Dilutive Issuance. Id. at 41–47.
17

Christopher Geczy et al., Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 105–14 (2015) (presenting the thirty-three constituency state
statutes in Appendix A, including Tennessee’s statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204
(2016)). Professor Haskell Murray also discussed Tennessee's “other constituency”
statute in his presentation, and the accompanying article, for this symposium. See J.
Haskell Murray, Examining Tennessee’s For-Profit Benefit Corporation Law, 19 TENN. J. BUS.
L. 325, 337 (2017).
18
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include employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and the community in
which a corporation is located. 19
Noteworthy too are the number of “traditional” publicly-traded
C-corporations incorporated in Delaware that top the ranks of the most
socially conscious companies, including Alphabet (Google) and Kellogg
Company. 20 These entities, and others like them, including Walt Disney
Company and Amazon, are quite open about their corporate social
responsibility (“CSR”) missions. 21 The difference between these entities
and the newer benefit corporations is that the boards of benefit corporations not only are explicitly permitted to consider non-profit-maximizing
goals, non-shareholder constituencies, and the environment, among
other things, in governance decision-making, but rather that they are
required to do so. 22 Further, many of the statutes under which benefit
19

See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204, which states, in part, that:
[N]or [shall] any of its officers and directors . . . be
held liable at law or in equity for . . . for opposing
any proposed merger, exchange, tender offer or
significant disposition of the assets of the resident
domestic corporation or any subsidiary of such
resident domestic corporation because of a good
faith belief that such merger, exchange, tender offer or significant disposition of assets would adversely affect the resident domestic corporation's
employees, customers, suppliers, the communities
in which such resident domestic corporation or its
subsidiaries operate or are located.

Id.
GOOGLE, https://environment.google/; KELLOGG, http://www.kelloggcompany.
com/en_US/corporate-responsibility.html; see also Jessica Chu, Note, Filling a
Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth of Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 22 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 191 (2012).
20

See, e.g., WALT DISNEY COMPANY, http://purpleteamdoesdisney.weebly.com/
csr.html; AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/p/feature/wnsdvqqghme982o.
21

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2016) (“A ‘public benefit corporation’ is a
for-profit corporation organized under and subject to the requirements of this chapter

22
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corporations are formed conspicuously state that these new forms are
not intended to, and will not, have an impact on the law pertaining to
other existing business entity forms. 23
Thinking more philosophically, the SWM theory more generally
assumes that there is a single definition of “shareholder” and one agreedupon notion of what that theoretical shareholder values, assumptions I
strongly dispute. The various shareholders of one particular company
have different needs and interests depending upon their investing time
horizons, degree of diversification and interests in other assets, and
perspectives on corporate ethics and social responsibility. The SWM
ideology appears to focus primarily on the interests of only a narrow
subgroup of shareholders whose focus is on short-term, opportunistic
financial plays. Short-term management decisions often are made at the
expense of long-term performance—think Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and

that is intended to produce a public benefit or public benefits and to operate in a
responsible and sustainable manner. To that end, a public benefit corporation shall be
managed in a manner that balances the stockholders' pecuniary interests, the best
interests of those materially affected by the corporation's conduct, and the public
benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation. In the certificate
of incorporation, a public benefit corporation shall: (1) Identify within its statement of
business or purpose pursuant to § 102(a)(3) of this title 1 or more specific public
benefits to be promoted by the corporation; and (2) State within its heading that it is a
public benefit corporation.”). While directors of benefit corporations are shielded from
personal liability, shareholders, sometimes based upon a size threshold, are authorized
to bring derivative suits, or benefit enforcement proceedings, if boards ignore their
benefit responsibilities. See id. § 367 (“Stockholders of a public benefit corporation
owning individually or collectively, as of the date of instituting such derivative suit, at
least 2% of the corporation's outstanding shares or, in the case of a corporation with
shares listed on a national securities exchange, the lesser of such percentage or shares
of at least $2,000,000 in market value, may maintain a derivative lawsuit to enforce the
requirements set forth in § 365(a) of this title.”).
See, e.g., id. § 368 (2013) (“This subchapter shall not affect a statute or rule of law that
is applicable to a corporation that is not a public benefit corporation . . . .”).
23
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other corporate scandals. 24 These opportunities often externalize costs,
may be ethically questionable or even criminal, and may be at the
expense of the welfare of others.
There is a growing body of academic literature that supports the
link between higher social and environmental performance and longterm financial performance. 25 The triple-bottom-line approach to
sustainable business, which measures corporate performance and success
in three separate dimensions: “economic prosperity, environmental
quality, and social justice,” 26 is attracting more and more corporate
adherents. Indeed, the “business case” showing how firms benefit from
engaging in acts of CSR is so well-established that it would be challenging for even the Freidman Kool-Aid-imbibing Justice Strine and
Chancellor Chandler from Delaware to find socially responsible decisions that are made in the name of SWM to be a breach of director
fiduciary duty.
And, there is already a significant market for socially-responsible
investors who reject those outcomes, and that market is increasing. 27
See generally William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got Taken for
Trillions by Corporate Insiders, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 69 (2002) (discussing the nature of
these and related scandals).
24

See, e.g., Gunnar Friede et al., ESG and Financial Performance: Aggregated Evidence from
More than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 210, 212 (2015).
25

Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for
Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 991 (2009) (citing JOHN ELKINGTON,
CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS 55
(1998)).
26

27

According to Bloomberg, about 84% of millennials are interested in socially responsible investing,
and that figure is not expected to change as the
generation ages, suggesting that demand for sustainable products will only increase. . . . [O]ver the
long term, it should provide returns greater than
funds that are not focused on ESG investing. . . .
For this reason, current investors and the largest

400

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 19

Indeed, shareholders are demanding it. In 2017 alone, shareholders
submitted some 345 proposals related to environmental and social issues
to public companies for presentation at shareholder meetings, 28 constituting 56% of all shareholder proposals. 29 Three climate change-related
proposals introduced at ExxonMobil, Occidental Petroleum, and PPL, a
utility holding company, received the support of a majority of shareholders; overall, climate change proposals received an average 33.8% support
from shareholders. 30
Most significantly, this support is coming not just from so-called
ESG (environmental, social, and governance factors) activist investors
such as the disdainfully-termed “gadfly” investors and the active sociallyoriented investment funds such as Trillium Asset Management and the
Nathan Cummings Foundation. It also is coming from large institutional
investors like BlackRock, Vanguard, and Fidelity, and the powerful
pension funds in New York, the New York State Common Retirement
Fund, and in California, the California Public Employees Retirement
System (CalPERS). 31
Despite all of these points of disagreement with Professor
Fershee’s prognosis, I cannot ignore the conditioned response that the
financial advisors are also moving in this direction,
creating another tailwind for ESG companies and
investments.
MoneyShow, Socially-Responsible Investing: Earn Better Returns from Good Companies, FORBES,
(Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/moneyshow/2017/08/16/socially-responsible-investing-earn-better-returns-from-good-companies/#623a3989623d.
Ronald O. Mueller & Elizabeth Ising, Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2017
Proxy Season, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 12, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/12/shareholder-proposal-developmentsduring-the-2017-proxy-season/.
28

James R. Copland & Margaret M. O’Keefe, 2017 Finding: Climate-Change Proposals
Break Through, PROXYMONITOR (2017), http://www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/2017
Finding1.aspx.
29

30

See id.

31

Id.
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SWM norm invokes in corporate boards, even in the absence of an
enforceable legal requirement. We are fortunate that we have not
adopted the concept of customary law as exists in international public
law. It may very well be that creating new structures that authorize/mandate corporate social responsibility actions will make legal
counsel and directors at traditional entities even more risk reverse in this
regard. Why even take the chance? If your board insists, wise counsel
would confirm that, in Delaware, the action would, in Chief Justice
Strine’s terms, “advance the interests of stockholders in the long run”? 32
There may be counsel recommending that their clients incorporate in
states with “other constituency” statutes or in jurisdictions with a
judiciary less populated with Freidman acolytes. Perhaps Delaware will
not always be the most important American jurisdiction 33 if its legal
framework is not conducive to the way that businesses seek to operate in
today’s environment, regardless of the sophistication of that framework.
The real danger that I see in the debate whether SWM is the law
or whether benefit corporation forms further entrench an already-firmlyestablished SWM norm is that the prevalence of the norm provides an
excuse for unscrupulous managers and boards of traditional corporations
to engage in short-term profit maximizing activities at the expense of
CSR efforts, a situation which will prove unfortunate both for society at
large and for shareholders over the long-term. As one pair of commentaStrine, supra note 9, at 764. (noting that commentators are not convinced that
corporations can engage in private ordering in its charter, bylaws, shareholders, or
board policies to mandate a corporate purpose that is inconsistent with SWM). See, e.g.,
Heminway, supra note 5, at 939, 966–67.
32

See infra. Specialized courts exist in twenty-eight states to resolve complex business
disputes, and similar courts are being formed internationally. See, e.g., Order Establishing the Davidson County Business Court Docket Pilot Project – Phase 2, TENN. SUP.
CT. (April 4, 2017), http://tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/order_establishing
_davidson_county_business_court_docket_pilot_project-phase_2. pdf; see also Michael
Cross, Brussels Latest to Announce English-Language Business Court, THE LAW SOC’Y
GAZETTE (October 30, 2017) (mentioning proposals for English-language courts in
Belgium, France, and The Netherlands), https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/brussels-latest-to-announce-english-language-business-court/5063460.article.
33
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tors has opined: “Shareholder primacy and shareholder wealth maximization are merely convenient scapegoats upon which to place the blame for
wrongful conduct.” 34

Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A Questionable Solution
to a Non-Existent Problem, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 617, 669 (2013).
34

